If it sounds too bad to be true, it probably isn’t

Given what the recent columns opposing the nuclear deal with Iran have stated, it would seem that Secretary of State John Kerry and the U.S. diplomatic team suffered an embarrassing defeat when negotiating the Iran nuclear deal. The facts of the situation reveal that wasn’t quite the case, although more than a cursory glance at headlines is required to see this.

Here’s the current situation in the absence of this deal. As per the Washington Institute, if starting today Iran were to use all of its uranium resources and only half of its 18,000 lower performance centrifuges, the breakout time, “the amount of time required to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one weapon,” would be two to three months. If Iran used the other half of those centrifuges as well, the breakout time would be further reduced to four to six weeks. What if they decided to also use the 1,000 higher performance centrifuges they’ve also installed? That puts the worst-case scenario at two to four weeks, meaning Iran currently has the capability to develop a nuclear weapon before the Fall semester starts. In an opinion piece posted last week, the new nuclear deal with Iran was said to represent a “patient pathway to a bomb” in which Iran behaves for the next 15 years and then has a breakout time of “nearly zero.” If a 15-year wait is the patient pathway, how exactly do we describe the 15-day wait?

Here is where a slew of half-truths begin to obscure reality. The aforementioned piece cites the same report in saying that Iran’s current breakout time is a comfortable three to seven months, neglecting to mention how that time range represents a situation in which Iran only uses a fraction of their centrifuges and uranium resources. On the other hand, estimates of a five to 11 day breakout time 10 to 15 years from now under the new deal are seemingly based not only on full utilization of current centrifuges, two-thirds of which will no longer be active under the deal, but also on the utilization of more advanced centrifuges which cannot be used toward the accumulation of enriched uranium under the agreement. The cherry-picked misinformation presented by those against the deal thus draws inaccurate comparisons of the pre- and post-deal situations.

The situation we are in currently is far more dangerous than the one we will be in for the next 10 to 15 years under the deal. But the factually questionable arguments against the deal deny that reality. In order to make a nuclear weapon, Iran needs about 27 kilograms of enriched uranium. This deal reduces the number of Iranian centrifuges used for the accumulation of enriched uranium by two-thirds and caps the maximum amount of enriched uranium in Iran at 300 kilograms. In layman’s terms, this means slower enrichment and less enriched uranium, which increase Iran’s breakout time to between seven months and one year for the next decade. However, Albert Antar’s column last week incorrectly stated that the new nuclear deal did not reduce the number of centrifuges in Iran, based on an article detailing an older, temporary deal and not the one currently being debated.

Similarly, specifics of the deal were misrepresented in Max Schreiber’s column, which made the claim that the United States had failed its citizens imprisoned in Iran by failing to negotiate their release in this deal. While we were not able to secure the release of the current prisoners, the particular claim that the U.S. was releasing an Iranian nuclear scientist as part of this deal was false. The prisoner in question had been released more than two years ago as part of back-channel negotiations which also led to the release of three Americans held in Iran. To imply that the U.S. released an Iranian prisoner as a capitulation without concern for our citizens is recklessly mendacious. In fact, the opening of diplomatic relations with Iran have made families of the hostages hopeful regarding the future release of the imprisoned Americans, a possibility that would be quashed if this deal is not approved.

Factual inconsistencies such as these underlie many of the arguments made last week. Claims that we would immediately, without ensuring any compliance by Iran, be “forking over $150 billion,” implied that sum is coming out of our wallets, despite the fact that the U.S. is not paying Iran. The money represents the unfreezing of Iran’s current assets, and the deal requires Iran to show significant down-scaling of its nuclear program before any funds are released. And while reasonable, factual arguments can be made against the deal, many of these arguments simply bemoan the imperfect deal without offering an alternative. The simplest way to look at this is that, in our current situation, Iran gets to accumulate enriched uranium, develop new nuclear facilities and reduce an already low breakout time, all while the world has severely limited access to the country’s nuclear sites, keeping us half-blind to the growth of their nuclear program. Any deal that limits accumulation and development while implementing a more thorough inspections regime is an improvement over our current situation.

I am well aware of the gravely concerning aspects of the deal. I’d rather the embargo on weapons sold to Iran not be lifted after five years. I would rest easier if Iran’s entire nuclear program was dismantled. But I firmly believe this deal to be preferable to the current situation. The further we delay diplomacy, the more we have to compromise to strike a deal, meaning a similar deal negotiated later would require more concessions on our side. While we stubbornly swore by sanctions and a refusal to negotiate, Iran’s stockpile of centrifuges and uranium grew steadily as the sanctions starved the Iranian people more so than they did the nuclear program. Instead of letting the situation worsen, this deal makes it impossible for Iran to get a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future while giving us the time and the inspectorial insight required to ensure our safety and that of the world from the threat of a nuclear Iran. Given that our current situation gives us neither the time nor methods of curbing Iran’s nuclear capacities, I believe this deal is beneficial.

Whether or not I have swayed your opinion, I hope that you take the time to become informed on this deal to the point where you can make a decision rooted in the facts. I am glad that The Chronicle and my fellow students have opened up this debate, though I would have liked it to have been less one-sided and more factual. At the very least, both sides agree how important the decision on this deal is and how crucial it is to be properly informed.