Multilateralism with a 'boom'

Like so many of you, I was horrified to wake up to the news of the bombing of the United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad last week. The strike severely undermined the legitimacy of President Bush's recent statement that, "Iraq is more secure now than at any other time since the war," and was undeniably a factor in the collapse of the cease-fire in Israel.

This attack should serve as a wakeup call to the Bush Administration that it is time to change our policy of peacekeeping in Iraq to prevent the situation from escalating further.

For months now, there has been an outcry, even in some of the very strongest pro-war circles, against the monopolization of Iraqi peacekeeping by coalition forces. A significant portion of the postwar tension in the United Nations has stemmed from concerns over our peacekeeping policy.

By excluding international peacekeepers from Iraq, we have only exacerbated concerns over our perceived imperial intent in the Middle East. Until last week, the consequences of our policy were limited to diplomatic tension and a massive increase in U.S. military casualties.

As problematic as the above consequences were, they are ones we consented to when we chose to go it alone, save our "coalition of the willing" in Iraq; but now that we have civilian casualties on our hands, it is our responsibility to assuage the problem by swallowing our collective pride and enlisting the assistance of our allies, both pro and anti-war.

Beyond concerns over diplomatic tension and rapidly increasing casualty figures, it is also important to bear in mind that if the past is at all indicative of our country's nation-building capabilities, a stable, capitalist, democratic Iraq will be nothing more than a dream without outside assistance.

One needs only to examine hosts of past debacles in Haiti, Cambodia, South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Panama to see that our track record in nation-building is less than stellar. Our successful efforts, including Japan and Grenada, involved massive investments of time, diplomatic and military manpower, and money through U.S. direct administration or surrogate regimes--investments that a United States rebounding from an economic downturn cannot support.

Furthermore, in an area that harbors as intense a distrust as that of much of the Middle East towards the United States, our singular involvement undermines the perceived legitimacy of any new government, not only in the eyes of other Middle Eastern countries, but in the hearts and minds of many Iraqis--a battlefield that no military power can win alone.

Our negative track record in nationbuilding and the mounting costs of Iraqi occupation leave a multilateral administrative policy as the least costly and least risky alternative available. While we have more than demonstrated our ability to win nearly any war that we choose to enter, our allies in Western Europe have demonstrated their competence in nation-building and peace keeping, especially under the auspices of United Nations sanctioned-actions.

Multilateral administration brings with it the obvious advantage of sharing the burden of costs in money, manpower, and materiel among several allies instead of leaving us to bear the brunt of those costs. The expansion of Iraqi administration to multilateral levels would significantly enhance the legitimacy of whatever new government comes to power--a vital step towards stabilizing the region.

Moreover, internationalizing peacekeeping and administration in Iraq would substantially ease tensions between us and our allies over what they perceive as imperial intent in Iraq.

The mounting complications and costs of rebuilding Iraq are quickly making a questionable foreign policy situation an extremely bad one. Should the rebuilding of Iraq stall, or worse, collapse entirely in the coming months, more blood will be shed, more lives wasted, and the Middle East could degenerate into even greater chaos.

By choosing to enter war in Iraq without significant international support, the U.S. put itself out on a limb from a strategic standpoint. We currently bear sole responsibility for the outcome of this situation. By internationalizing peacekeeping and nation-building in Iraq, we would receive the benefits of decreased liability in the event of failure, a higher probability of success, and lower long-term costs, not only in money, but in lives.

Although there are never any guarantees when dealing with the Middle East, or with the international community at large, the likelihood of success in Iraq and in stabilizing Middle Eastern turbulence will increase remarkably as a result of a genuine multilateral effort.

And it comes only at the cost of some of the pride of our government.

Brian Vetter is a Trinity sophomore. His column appears every other week.