Regular readers of this column will know that I have nothing but the utmost respect for the armed men and women of the United States and its allies. However, unequivocal admiration of those who carry out orders does not mean that we have to blindly agree with the decisions that are made at the highest levels of our military establishment. This is the case, regrettably, with the Defense Department's newly formed Northern Command, which is military command responsible for homeland security.
NorthCom represents the most fundamental change made in the command structure of the U.S. military in decades. It is also one of the least useful and most ridiculous ideas to come out of the Pentagon in living memory. About the only element of our modern defense strategy more ill-conceived was the so-called "two-war theory," and if you don't know what this is, just be thankful that Rumsfeld sent it last year into early retirement.
For decades, forward-deployed U.S. forces have been organized into four commands, one each for Europe, South America, the Pacific and the Middle East. Each is headed by a four-star flag officer, and all branches of the military in a region report to this one commander. A similar organizational structureâ??though based on functionality, not geographyâ??is followed by troops within the fifty states. The idea is a perfectly good oneâ??it simplifies management and ensures unity of command, even if "jointness" among different services is difficult to achieve in practice. Thus, the Pentagon reasoned, establishing NorthCom to manage its domestic defense effort will be a panacea when it comes to preventing, and dealing with, terror at home.
There is so much that is wrong with this idea that I hardly know where to begin. We can start with the fact that the head of NorthCom would be, in a sense, the most powerful officer in the entire U.S. military. Whichever service this person comes fromâ??currently the Air Forceâ??will be hugely envied by the other three, and even if the same can be said of the Joint Chiefs chairman, remember that the "first among equals" of the service chiefs does not typically micromanage their domains. In an age when coordination among the branches is pivotal, this plan would only serve to entrench inter-branch rivalry.
The Pentagon has also not made clear what exactly the prerogatives of the NorthCom's leader will be. In general, an officer automatically bears the right to protect his or her command, so that a submarine captain can order a torpedo launch, a platoon lieutenant on a peacekeeping mission can return enemy fire, and so forth. NorthCom, on the other hand, will be responsible for the entire continental United States, as well as Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean. Does this mean that its commander will have the unlimited power to respond, without consulting Washington, to any attack upon American soil? This is an absolutely critical point, and it is one that has so far not been adequately addressed.
Because NorthCom and the existing North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) will be headed by the same individual, this only exacerbates the potential for confusion in a time of crisis and misuse of extraordinary power. NORAD already has the statutory authority to protect American and Canadian airspace from intruders and has kept it after NorthCom was established in October. The administrative overlap between these two commands will inevitably become a huge source of inefficiency, even though the intent is quite the opposite.
Because this historic reform was pushed through in such a rush, there has been far too little time to examine the constitutional and legal ramifications of assigning responsibility for homeland security to a standing army. Only a conspiracy theorist will conclude that NorthCom is the prelude to a military dictatorship, but the ancient principle of posse comitatus dictates that, in general, law enforcement is the exclusive province of civil authorities. Any changes to this policy should not have been made without substantial political discussion.
In principle, there are good arguments to be made in favor of giving the military a greater role in securing the nation's borders and interior. In an age where local authorities can easily be overwhelmed by a massive terrorist attackâ??or a natural disaster, for that matterâ??the resources and capabilities of the Defense Department are instrumental in saving lives and restoring order. There is no reason, though, why such assistance could not be provided via the existing command structure. After the World Trade Center attack, there was a tangible response by the militaryâ??an aircraft carrier and naval hospital ships sailed into New York harbor, fighter jets patrolled the city's airspace, and the National Guard was dispatched to evacuate lower Manhattan.
The principal problem on Sept. 11 was that the military's response was limited due to purely logistical reasons. We've long known that because pilots were not on standby, interceptors sent to New York after the first impact arrived too late to stop the second plane. This was obviously neither the fault of the pilots nor even of their superiors, but it does illustrate that it's the little things that make the difference between success and failure. In other words, another four-star general in Colorado Springs or undersecretary in Washington will not be instrumental in addressing future threatsâ??what really matters is the operational readiness of commanders at the local level.
In short, NorthCom will create more problems than it will solve. It is more than a little ironic that a president who has always championed leaner bureaucracy supports the creation of an entirely new one. This is certainly not the best way that our government can provide for the common defense in these difficult times.
Pavel Molchanov is a Trinity senior. His column appears every other Tuesday.
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