The date is July 4, 2001. Hazy afternoon sunshine fills the skies over Washington, D.C. Hundreds of thousands of people have converged on the capital city for a celebration of the 225th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Throngs of people line the parade route to get a glimpse of the President and the First Lady. Children, madly waving American flags, sit atop their parents' shoulders so they can get a better view of the festivities. Everyone waits for the evening's fireworks display.

For the unsuspecting multitudes, however, the real fireworks come at 3:31 in the afternoon. A crude nuclear device, smuggled into the capital in a suitcase, detonates at the Washington Monument. A giant mushroom cloud rises into the heavens and then all is silent.

Sound farfetched? Think again. Counterproliferation experts predict that by the late 1990s or early 21st century, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Algeria will possess one to three nuclear bombs each. Together, these nations represent a virtual "Who's Who" of nations that sponsor terrorism. Needless to say, these nations do not particularly have warm feelings towards the United States. Will you feel safe to go to sleep at night in a world where Muammar Khaddafi has a nuclear bomb at his disposal?

Unfortunately, no international measures short of the use of force can prevent a determined nation from obtaining the bomb. As nuclear missiles in the former Soviet Union are dismantled, excess fissile material falls into the hands of Third World agents on the black market. In addition, the Clinton Administration has announced plans to ease its export controls on sensitive technologies that could be used to manufacture nuclear warheads; thus, the path to the bomb for aspiring nuclear nations will be shortened.

Furthermore, as the United States allows North Korea to stall for time while it hides its nuclear materials from inspection, we send a clear message to the Libyas and Iraqs of the world that the United States is powerless to stop them.

Perhaps it is our own fault that we lack credibility on counterproliferation. Due to domestic support for Israel and our reliance on Israel as our anti-Soviet proxy in the Middle East during the Cold War, we looked the other way as Israel amassed a large nuclear arsenal. In addition, we supplied Pakistan with military aid during the war in Afghanistan, to aid the mujahedin against the invading Soviet army. Even though we knew that Pakistan was going nuclear, we only suspended aid twice for brief periods of time. In both of these cases, Cold War concerns outweighed proliferation concerns.

Now that the Cold War has ended and we are faced with the prospect that unfriendly nations will soon have the bomb, counterproliferation must be placed at the top of the U.S. foreign policy list of objectives. Desert Storm seemed relatively easy, right? Well, what if Saddam Hussein had possessed even one nuclear bomb? After the war, one inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq said that his inspection team found a crude bomb on a workbench that was so unstable that it looked as if it might detonate if it fell off the table! Saddam was a lot closer than we thought. Next time, we might not be so lucky.

The United States can take actions to slow the course of global proliferation so as to better manage its destabilizing effects. First, the United States must strictly enforce export controls on the most sensitive technologies that could be used for nuclear weapons development and seek to provide encouragement, as well as technical and financial support, to nations that wish to impose similar controls.

Second, the United States must step up the flow of financial assistance to the former Soviet republics for the safe transport of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for secure storage of warheads and excess fissile material.

Third, the United States must ensure that the IAEA possesses the resources, authority, and especially, enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities, both technical and human, necessary to detect clandestine nuclear programs, before we are faced with another Iraq or North Korea. Further, once a nation's program has been terminated, the United States must remain vigilant to ensure that it is not resuscitated. If we lower our guard and Saddam gets the bomb, then a second war in the Gulf cannot be far away.

Most importantly, the United States can make a strong statement to aspiring nuclear nations by rolling back North Korea's nuclear program. If Kim Il Sung gets the bomb, then Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will have every justification to go nuclear, and they can all do so in a very short time. The more nations that have the bomb, the more complicated U.S. foreign policy becomes.

It would be better to use force now, if necessary, against North Korea, when it might have a bomb or two, then later, if Kim Il Sung or his successor son uses a nuclear arsenal of ten or more bombs in a takeover of the Korean peninsula. The possibility of the United States being forced to use nuclear weapons against a second Asian nation in this century is not a policy option I wish to ponder.

Jeff Weiss is a Trinity senior.