Affirm affirmative action

The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a case that may result in the overturn of affirmative action policies in college admissions. The new case, Fisher v. University of Texas, has a number of idiosyncratic details that may weaken the scope of the Court’s final decision, but it is nonetheless the first affirmative action case that the Court has heard since Grutter v. Bollinger in 2003—which allowed for but did not require that colleges take race into account when making admissions decisions.

In light of the Fisher case, we should consider not only possible justifications for affirmative action, but also how these justifications must shape its eventual practice.

There are at least two justifications for the consideration of race in the college admissions process: justice and diversity.

Proponents of the justice argument claim that affirmative action policies are legitimate because they help to correct for the past oppression of minority groups. While the intent to calibrate for systemic inequities in the college admissions process has substantial ethical justification, race is not the best criteria to use in practice. One reason is that, in any given society, the relative social statuses of different races change over time. The better indicator is socioeconomic status, which is not well captured by race. The justice argument gives us reason to pay special attention to socioeconomic status, but not race, in admissions.

The Asian-American case shows the short comings of the justice argument. Asian-Americans­ have been subject to discrimination and social inequities many times throughout this country’s history. Yet, in past years, Asian-American students—with SAT scores higher than any other racial group, including whites—have been disproportionately successful in gaining admission to elite private universities. In fact, many critics now believe that reverse discrimination against Asian-Americans is now common practice. Asian-Americans should not face discrimination in admissions, but justice is no reason to favor an already well represented group.

The justice argument cannot get race into admissions. But another justification—and, we believe, a sufficient one—is the diversity argument. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court cited diversity as a source of lively classroom discussion and cross-cultural inquiry and relations—a sufficient justification for affirmative action.

Though valid in principle, this line of reasoning warrants scrutiny. Broad racial identifications—like “White” or “Asian”—are a weak proxy for diversity. Race is a useful proxy for diversity only insomuch as it reflects one’s links to cultural practices and traditions or plays an important role in one’s identity. To that end, the handful of race-identifying boxes on the Common Application is hardly adequate.

How, then, should universities—and, in particular, Duke—tailor their admissions processes to maximize both justice and diversity in a sensible way? This is clearly a difficult question; were it not, the Supreme Court wouldn’t have heard two cases on the topic in the last decade. One option, which may be most sensible for small or medium sized private institutions like Duke, is to allow for—or make mandatory—additional application supplements that focus on the uniqueness of applicants’ backgrounds.