By most accounts, North Korea is very close to marrying a functioning and minimized nuclear warhead onto a functioning long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This would imply the capacity to strike the East Coast of the U.S. We already know that the North Koreans are capable of striking Seoul and Tokyo with Hwasong-6 and Extended Range Scud missiles, respectively. North Korea is also in possession of an operational Taepodong-2 ICBM that is capable of reaching the continental U.S.
A nuclear North Korea that wouldn’t dare breathe but with the guarantee of Chinese extended deterrence is surely a positive for dreams of Chinese regional hegemony. China’s encroachment on the international waters of the South China Sea, its norm-setting behavior in the rejection of the UNCLOS Arbitration Court decision out of the Philippines, not to mention its own nuclear weapons and unprecedented economic power, made this seem hunky dory for China. The prospect had Xi Jinping, with Rocket Man on a short leash, set to cast his influence over all of Asia.
The U.S. has previously offered South Korea the following ultimatum: either proliferate and you don’t get our extended deterrence, or don’t build your own nuclear weapons and we will protect you. Seoul took the latter, much unlike Britain and France during the Cold War, two countries that were given the very same ultimatum. It is arguable that China’s train of thought was that the U.S. might repeat its ultimatum to Seoul and Tokyo, with American extended deterrence being so key that they would give the same answer.
If indeed that was an aspect of their strategy, South Korea and Japan might be slowly realizing, much like the Brits and the French did during the Cold War, that the U.S. would never risk New York or Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul. The circumstances since the United States’ last ultimatum to Japan and South Korea have changed drastically, with the strike capacity of North Korea now arguably forcing Japan and South Korea to militarize and possibly adopt nuclear weapons. The Chinese miscalculation lies in the fact that although it might issue some harsh words in adherence to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is unlikely that the US will have either the capacity or the desire to inhibit the beating of nuclear war drums in South Korea and Japan. This, two regional competitors’ possession of nuclear weapons, is the worst nightmare for the Chinese.
China might well have strategized the driving of a wedge in between the US and its Asian allies by forcing them to adopt nuclear weapons. Surely this would have been checkmate —either Seoul and Japan proliferate and are ostracized by the US for undermining the NPT, leaving the U.S. with no significant regional proxy, or a nuclear maddog Kim under Chinese control forces Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington to be more far more cautious in trying to secure their own regional strategic goals—like the South China Sea’s important shipping lanes.
What China might now be realizing is that they initially overestimated the US’ commitment to treaty international law and non-proliferation - as per the United States’ tendency to strategically champion universalism and international norms as a strategic soft power tool. Indeed, the US has allowed allies in the past to forego norms of nuclear taboo. Take Israel as an example; when the US needs a powerful regional ally through which it can secure its interests, and when there are significant regional threats to that ally, it might be somewhat palatable for an ally to proliferate.
It would be unthinkable for the Chinese to have a U.S.-backed and nuclear Japan and South Korea. This arguably explains the softening of behavior on behalf of the Chinese, who may be hoping to tamp some of the security pressure on Tokyo and Seoul. Weeks ago, China asked most North Korean companies to leave by January. Beijing also very recently made a generous compromise in allowing South Korea to retain its American Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) despite previously fretting over national security issues.
Now fearing proliferation by its competitors resulting in far more powerful U.S. proxies, as possibly preluded by Japan’s amendment of the pacifist clause within their postwar constitution, China prefers detente over enmity. As opposed to a club to wield against America in the dispute over the South China Sea, a nuclear North Korea risks turning into an obstacle for the Chinese.
It is also undeniable—or so it seems—that North Korea has acted rationally and in its own interest when it comes to the adoption of nuclear weapons. If it hadn’t been for the threat of nuclear backlash, it is sensible to believe that a strategy of regime change might have been implemented in order to remove Kim Jong-un. What might now be in the works, however, is a growing understanding within the upper echelons of the North Korean regime that possession of nuclear weapons might actually only help in isolating the hermit kingdom.
Indeed, a nuclear weapon with functioning delivery systems is certainly a strong deterrent in the face of potential U.S. intervention or interference in North Korean affairs, although hindsight might imply that the Kim regime would have been better off without the nuclear capabilities.
If it hadn’t been for the possession of nuclear weapons, China might still have had North Korea as a significant economic ally. The sensitivity of the international economic web means that China’s actions have drawn potentially harmful side effects in the form of sanctions. The tactic that has come to define China’s development has been export-led growth dependent on neoliberalism. Thus, a nuclear North Korea sees China’s greatest advantage as its potential greatest weakness due to pressure implemented by the United States.
President Trump’s apparently insane suggestion to sanction all countries that partake in trade with North Korea, along with a plethora of rhetorical first-strikes, might have actually helped. Convincing the Chinese and North Koreans that the U.S. is willing to do the unthinkable—“boat-rocking”—has seemingly been efficacious in not necessarily getting our opposite numbers to swallow a bluff but rather convincing them not to take the risk of what we have threatened to carry out.
Of course, this comes with limits, but the more undeterrable we seem, the more effective our deterrence becomes. This also matches the pattern of unprecedentedly aggressive comments by Secretary Tillerson and Defense Secretary Mattis; North Korea adopted its proliferation strategy with the sole purpose of survival, and China does not want American occupation of the peninsula. The perceived risk of these Sino-North Korean interests being crippled might have led to some of the positive changes we have recently seen.
China’s overarching strategy since the late 20th century has been export-led growth, exploiting the neoliberal world order by producing greater amounts of manufactured goods at a lower price. With this, however, China’s growth is made dependent upon the whims of other states–hence the arguable efficacy of the sanctions Twitter threat. A great threat on China’s entire economic grand strategy does not go hand in hand with President Xi’s great-man style prophecy at the CCP conference a month ago. One might also add that a threat to the economy is a threat to defense, as China then either produces less powerful weaponry or it becomes dependent upon other countries for its defense–something it feels is a risk because China would yet again be under the influence of external forces.
In short, China does not believe that North Korea is worth it. Pyongyang and Beijing seem to have walked themselves into their own trap, and perceived U.S. aggression has defused the situation due to Chinese priorities. As to whether this has been good, calculated foreign policy on behalf of the Trump administration or simply a lucky streak, waiting to be pushed too far—the coming months might be the arbiter.
Eren Bagis is a Trinity first-year. His column runs once monthly.
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Eren Bagis is a Trinity first-year. His column runs once monthly.